Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness-of-Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher-Order Representational Theories.
According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard...
| Published in: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 98; no. 4; pp. 555 - 576 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2017
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher-order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher-order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness-of-grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have. |
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