Newton: From Certainty to Probability?

Newton's earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only did he aim for certainty; he also claimed success. Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately gave up claims of certainty in favor of a high degree of probability. I argue that no such shift occurred. I examine...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 84; no. 5; pp. 866 - 879
Autor principal: Walsh, Kirsten
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2017
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Newton-Raphson method
        Philosophy
        Probability theory
        Journalists
        Criticism
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          Newton-Raphson method
          Philosophy
          Probability theory
          Journalists
          Criticism
      ab: Newton's earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only did he aim for certainty; he also claimed success. Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately gave up claims of certainty in favor of a high degree of probability. I argue that no such shift occurred. I examine the evidence of a probabilistic shift: a passage from query 23/31 of the Opticks and rule 4 of the Principia. Neither passage supports a probabilistic approach to natural philosophy. The aim of certainty, then, was an enduring feature of Newton's methodology.
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