Newton: From Certainty to Probability?
Newton's earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only did he aim for certainty; he also claimed success. Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately gave up claims of certainty in favor of a high degree of probability. I argue that no such shift occurred. I examine...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 84; no. 5; pp. 866 - 879 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Newton's earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only did he aim for certainty; he also claimed success. Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately gave up claims of certainty in favor of a high degree of probability. I argue that no such shift occurred. I examine the evidence of a probabilistic shift: a passage from query 23/31 of the Opticks and rule 4 of the Principia. Neither passage supports a probabilistic approach to natural philosophy. The aim of certainty, then, was an enduring feature of Newton's methodology. |
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