Bayes, Bounds and Rational Analysis.
While Bayesian models have been applied to an impressive range of cognitive phenomena, methodological challenges have been leveled concerning their role in the program of rational analysis. The focus of the current article is on computational impediments to probabilistic inference and related puzzle...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 85; no. 1; pp. 79 - 102 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | While Bayesian models have been applied to an impressive range of cognitive phenomena, methodological challenges have been leveled concerning their role in the program of rational analysis. The focus of the current article is on computational impediments to probabilistic inference and related puzzles about empirical confirmation of these models. The proposal is to rethink the role of Bayesian methods in rational analysis, to adopt an independently motivated notion of rationality appropriate for computationally bounded agents, and to explore broad conditions under which (approximately) Bayesian agents would be rational. The proposal is illustrated with a characterization of costs inspired by thermodynamics. |
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