Bayes, Bounds and Rational Analysis.

While Bayesian models have been applied to an impressive range of cognitive phenomena, methodological challenges have been leveled concerning their role in the program of rational analysis. The focus of the current article is on computational impediments to probabilistic inference and related puzzle...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 85; no. 1; pp. 79 - 102
Autor principal: Icard, Thomas F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jan2018
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Bayes, Bounds and Rational Analysis.
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        au: Icard, Thomas F.
      su:
        Bayesian analysis
        Cognition
        Methodology
        Probabilism
        Thermodynamics
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        subj:
          Bayesian analysis
          Cognition
          Methodology
          Probabilism
          Thermodynamics
      ab: While Bayesian models have been applied to an impressive range of cognitive phenomena, methodological challenges have been leveled concerning their role in the program of rational analysis. The focus of the current article is on computational impediments to probabilistic inference and related puzzles about empirical confirmation of these models. The proposal is to rethink the role of Bayesian methods in rational analysis, to adopt an independently motivated notion of rationality appropriate for computationally bounded agents, and to explore broad conditions under which (approximately) Bayesian agents would be rational. The proposal is illustrated with a characterization of costs inspired by thermodynamics.
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    language: English
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