All‐units discounts as a partial foreclosure device.
Abstract: We investigate the strategic effects of all‐units discounts (AUDs) used by a dominant firm in the presence of a capacity‐constrained rival. Due to the limited capacity of the rival, the dominant firm has a captive portion of the buyer's demand for the single product. As compared to linear...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 1; pp. 155 - 181 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=127932160&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 127932160 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2018 vid: 49 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 127932160 10.1111/1756-2171.12220 ppf: 155 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 474KB tig: atl: All‐units discounts as a partial foreclosure device. aug: au: Chao, Yong Tan, Guofu Wong, Adam Chi Leung affil: University of Louisville University of Southern California Lingnan University su: European Commission Economic demand Antitrust law Intermediate goods Commercial products sug: subj: Economic demand European Commission Commodity Contracts Dealing Commodity Contracts Brokerage Antitrust law Intermediate goods Commercial products ab: Abstract: We investigate the strategic effects of all‐units discounts (AUDs) used by a dominant firm in the presence of a capacity‐constrained rival. Due to the limited capacity of the rival, the dominant firm has a captive portion of the buyer's demand for the single product. As compared to linear pricing, the dominant firm can use AUDs to go beyond its captive portion by tying its captive demand with part of the competitive demand and partially foreclose its small rival. When the rival's capacity level is well below relevant demand, AUDs reduce the buyer's surplus. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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