The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.

In this paper I defend dependence on moral testimony. I show how going defenses of dependence on moral testimony have portrayed it as second-best by centering on how and why it is an important means to overcoming our defects. I argue that once we consider the pervasiveness of moral testimony in the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 175; no. 3; pp. 629 - 648
Autor principal: McShane, Paddy Jane
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2018
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:In this paper I defend dependence on moral testimony. I show how going defenses of dependence on moral testimony have portrayed it as second-best by centering on how and why it is an important means to overcoming our defects. I argue that once we consider the pervasiveness of moral testimony in the context of intimate relationships, we can see that the value of dependence on moral testimony goes beyond this: it is not only our flaws and limitations that justify our dependence on moral testimony, but also the importance of such dependence for the flourishing of our intimate relationships. On my view, dependence on moral testimony is not simply for those who cannot realize the ideals of moral agency; it is among those ideals.