The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.

In this paper I defend dependence on moral testimony. I show how going defenses of dependence on moral testimony have portrayed it as second-best by centering on how and why it is an important means to overcoming our defects. I argue that once we consider the pervasiveness of moral testimony in the...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 175; no. 3; pp. 629 - 648
Autor principal: McShane, Paddy Jane
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.
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        au: McShane, Paddy Jane
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Portland, 5000 N. Willamette Blvd., 97203, Portland, OR, USA
      su:
        Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
        Moral agent (Philosophy)
        Moral realism
        Ethics
        Optimism
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          Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
          Moral agent (Philosophy)
          Moral realism
          Ethics
          Optimism
      keyword:
        Dependence
        Moral deference
        Moral testimony
        Trust
      ab: In this paper I defend dependence on moral testimony. I show how going defenses of dependence on moral testimony have portrayed it as second-best by centering on how and why it is an important means to overcoming our defects. I argue that once we consider the pervasiveness of moral testimony in the context of intimate relationships, we can see that the value of dependence on moral testimony goes beyond this: it is not only our flaws and limitations that justify our dependence on moral testimony, but also the importance of such dependence for the flourishing of our intimate relationships. On my view, dependence on moral testimony is not simply for those who cannot realize the ideals of moral agency; it is among those ideals.
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    language: English
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