An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation.

Abstract: We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement when a follow‐on innovator may infringe the patent of an initial innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular “lost profit” (LP) and “unjust enrichment” (UE) rules, coupled with a lump‐sum t...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 370 - 398
Autores principales: Chen, Yongmin, Sappington, David E. M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Summer2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation.
      aug:
        au:
          Chen, Yongmin
          Sappington, David E. M.
        affil:
          University of Colorado
          University of Florida
      su:
        Technological innovations
        Patent infringement
        Unjust enrichment
        Lost profits damages
        Patent law
      sug:
        subj:
          Technological innovations
          Patent infringement
          Unjust enrichment
          Lost profits damages
          Patent law
      ab: Abstract: We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement when a follow‐on innovator may infringe the patent of an initial innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular “lost profit” (LP) and “unjust enrichment” (UE) rules, coupled with a lump‐sum transfer between innovators. Such linear rules can sometimes induce the socially optimal levels of sequential innovation and the optimal allocation of industry output. The optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all rules that ensure a balanced budget for the industry, and often secures substantially more welfare than either the LP rule or the UE rule.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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