Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets.
When will a monopolist have incentives to leverage her/his market power in a primary market to foreclose competition in a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of her/his products with those of her/his rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents fro...
| Publicado en: | Economica Vol. 85; no. 340; pp. 873 - 903 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=131662741&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 131662741 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00130427 ECA jtl: Economica issn: 00130427 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 85 iid: 340 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 131662741 10.1111/ecca.12257 ppf: 873 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets. aug: au: Genakos, Christos Kühn, Kai‐Uwe Van Reenen, John affil: Cambridge Judge Business School, AUEB, CEP and CEPR University of East Anglia and CEPR MIT, CEP, CEPR and NBER su: Monopolies Computer industry Economic competition Internetworking Client/server computing sug: subj: Monopolies Computer industry Economic competition Electronic Computer Manufacturing Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing Computer and software stores Electronics Stores Computer, computer peripheral and pre-packaged software merchant wholesalers Internetworking Client/server computing ab: When will a monopolist have incentives to leverage her/his market power in a primary market to foreclose competition in a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of her/his products with those of her/his rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents from the monopoly market by ‘restoring’ second‐degree price discrimination. In a random coefficient model with complements, we derive a policy test for when incentives to reduce rival quality will hold. Our application is to Microsoft's alleged strategic incentives to leverage market power from personal computer to server operating systems. We estimate a structural random coefficients demand system that allows for complements (personal computers and servers). Our estimates suggest that there were incentives to reduce interoperability that were particularly strong at the turn of the 21st century. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|