Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets.

When will a monopolist have incentives to leverage her/his market power in a primary market to foreclose competition in a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of her/his products with those of her/his rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents fro...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Economica Vol. 85; no. 340; pp. 873 - 903
Autores principales: Genakos, Christos, Kühn, Kai‐Uwe, Van Reenen, John
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2018
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost