Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail.
The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 52; no. 4; pp. 921 - 946 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=132809560&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 132809560 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2018 vid: 52 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 132809560 10.1111/nous.12186 ppf: 921 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 361KB tig: atl: Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail. aug: au: Lederman, Harvey su: Coordination games (Mathematics) Electronic games Mathematical models Reason Belief & doubt sug: subj: Coordination games (Mathematics) Electronic games Mathematical models Reason Belief & doubt ab: The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents will not coordinate in situations where it would be rational to coordinate. I argue that we should resolve this conflict between the models and facts about what it would be rational to do by rejecting common knowledge assumptions implicit in the models. I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge that they are rational, and provide models to show that denying this assumption suffices for a resolution of the paradoxes. I describe how my resolution of the paradoxes fits into a general story about the relationship between rationality in situations involving a single agent and rationality in situations involving many agents. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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