Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail.

The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 52; no. 4; pp. 921 - 946
Autor principal:	Lederman, Harvey
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Dec2018
Materias:	Coordination games (Mathematics) Electronic games Mathematical models Reason Belief & doubt
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost