Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument from Impartiality.
After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assu...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 37; no. 4; pp. 591 - 603 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assumptions are at work (§ 4). Next (§§ 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally (§ 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality. |
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