Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument from Impartiality.

After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assu...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 37; no. 4; pp. 591 - 603
Autor principal: Mancuso, Giuliana
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=132814761&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 132814761
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01677411
        NM2
      jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy
      issn: 01677411
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Dec2018
      vid: 37
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        132814761
        10.1007/s11245-016-9449-1
      ppf: 591
      ppct: 12
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 702KB
      tig:
        atl: Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument from Impartiality.
      aug:
        au: Mancuso, Giuliana
        affil: Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Milan), Largo Gemelli 1, 20123, Milan, Italy
      su:
        Ethics
        Fairness
        Phenomenology
        Realism
        Objectivism (Philosophy)
      sug:
        subj:
          Ethics
          Fairness
          Phenomenology
          Realism
          Objectivism (Philosophy)
      keyword:
        Disagreement
        Impartiality
        Moral objectivism
        Moral phenomenology
        Non-naturalism
        Robust realism
      ab: After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assumptions are at work (§ 4). Next (§§ 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally (§ 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2018
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N