Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision.
We study the benefits and costs of "opacity" (deliberate lack of transparency) of incentive schemes as a strategy to combat gaming by better informed agents. In a two‐task moral hazard model in which only the agent knows which task is less costly, the agent has an incentive to focus his effort on th...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 4; pp. 819 - 855 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=132965834&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 132965834 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2018 vid: 49 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 132965834 10.1111/1756-2171.12253 ppf: 819 ppct: 36 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 681KB tig: atl: Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision. aug: au: Ederer, Florian Holden, Richard Meyer, Margaret affil: Yale University University of New South Wales Oxford University and CEPR su: Organizational transparency Risk aversion Gambling industry Labor incentives Gambling taxes sug: subj: Organizational transparency Risk aversion Other Gambling Industries Casinos (except Casino Hotels) All other gambling industries Gambling industry Labor incentives Gambling taxes ab: We study the benefits and costs of "opacity" (deliberate lack of transparency) of incentive schemes as a strategy to combat gaming by better informed agents. In a two‐task moral hazard model in which only the agent knows which task is less costly, the agent has an incentive to focus his effort on the less costly task. Opaque schemes, which make a risk‐averse agent uncertain about which task will be more highly rewarded, mitigate such gaming but impose more risk. We identify environments in which opaque schemes not only dominate transparent ones, but also eliminate the costs of the agent's hidden information. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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