Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision.

We study the benefits and costs of "opacity" (deliberate lack of transparency) of incentive schemes as a strategy to combat gaming by better informed agents. In a two‐task moral hazard model in which only the agent knows which task is less costly, the agent has an incentive to focus his effort on th...

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Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 4; pp. 819 - 855
Autores principales:	Ederer, Florian, Holden, Richard, Meyer, Margaret
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Winter2018
Materias:	Organizational transparency Risk aversion Gambling industry Labor incentives Gambling taxes
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost