Absolute Time: The Limit of Kant's Idealism.
I examine here if Kant can explain our knowledge of duration by showing that time has metric structure. To do so, I spell out two possible solutions: time's metric could be intrinsic or extrinsic. I argue that Kant's resources are too weak to secure any intrinsic, transcendentally‐based temporal met...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 53; no. 2; pp. 433 - 462 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I examine here if Kant can explain our knowledge of duration by showing that time has metric structure. To do so, I spell out two possible solutions: time's metric could be intrinsic or extrinsic. I argue that Kant's resources are too weak to secure any intrinsic, transcendentally‐based temporal metrics; but he can supply an extrinsic metric, based in a metaphysical fact about matter. I conclude that Transcendental Idealism is incomplete: it cannot account for the durative aspects of experience—or it can do so only with help from a non‐trivial metaphysics of material substance. |
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