Absolute Time: The Limit of Kant's Idealism.

I examine here if Kant can explain our knowledge of duration by showing that time has metric structure. To do so, I spell out two possible solutions: time's metric could be intrinsic or extrinsic. I argue that Kant's resources are too weak to secure any intrinsic, transcendentally‐based temporal met...

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Published in:Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 53; no. 2; pp. 433 - 462
Main Author: Stan, Marius
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2019
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Stan, Marius
        affil: Boston College
      su:
        Idealism
        Theory of knowledge
        Transcendentalism (Philosophy)
        Metaphysics
        Time perception
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          Idealism
          Theory of knowledge
          Transcendentalism (Philosophy)
          Metaphysics
          Time perception
      ab: I examine here if Kant can explain our knowledge of duration by showing that time has metric structure. To do so, I spell out two possible solutions: time's metric could be intrinsic or extrinsic. I argue that Kant's resources are too weak to secure any intrinsic, transcendentally‐based temporal metrics; but he can supply an extrinsic metric, based in a metaphysical fact about matter. I conclude that Transcendental Idealism is incomplete: it cannot account for the durative aspects of experience—or it can do so only with help from a non‐trivial metaphysics of material substance.
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