Contracting on litigation.

Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of liti...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 391 - 418
Autores principales: Spier, Kathryn E., Prescott, J.J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Summer2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Contracting on litigation.
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        au:
          Spier, Kathryn E.
          Prescott, J.J.
        affil:
          Harvard University and NBER
          University of Michigan
      su:
        Legal settlement
        Actions & defenses (Law)
        Legal costs
        Third parties (Law)
        Trial preparation
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          Legal settlement
          Actions & defenses (Law)
          Legal costs
          Third parties (Law)
          Trial preparation
      ab: Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third‐party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk‐neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction‐cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.
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    language: English
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