Contracting on litigation.

Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of liti...

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Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 391 - 418
Autores principales:	Spier, Kathryn E., Prescott, J.J.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Summer2019
Materias:	Legal settlement Actions & defenses (Law) Legal costs Third parties (Law) Trial preparation
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost