Naïve realism about unconscious perception.
Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK tu...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 196; no. 5; pp. 2045 - 2074 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=136187045&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 136187045 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2019 vid: 196 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 136187045 10.1007/s11229-017-1570-1 ppf: 2045 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 540KB tig: atl: Naïve realism about unconscious perception. aug: au: Zięba, Paweł Jakub affil: Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland su: Innocence (Psychology) Realism Sensory perception Act psychology Consciousness sug: subj: Innocence (Psychology) Realism Sensory perception Act psychology Consciousness keyword: Intentionalism Naïve realism Perceptual relation Unconscious perception ab: Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2019. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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