Naïve realism about unconscious perception.

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK tu...

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Publicado en:	Synthese Vol. 196; no. 5; pp. 2045 - 2074
Autor principal:	Zięba, Paweł Jakub
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature May2019
Materias:	Innocence (Psychology) Realism Sensory perception Act psychology Consciousness
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost