RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS.

Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM)...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 57; no. 4; pp. 2163 - 2184
Autores principales:	Angelovski, Andrej, Neugebauer, Tibor, Servátka, Maroš
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Oct2019
Materias:	Public goods Social entrepreneurship Internal revenue International sanctions Nash equilibrium
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost