RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS.
Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM)...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 57; no. 4; pp. 2163 - 2184 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=138089061&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 138089061 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2019 vid: 57 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 138089061 10.1111/ecin.12797 ppf: 2163 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.6MB tig: atl: RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS. aug: au: Angelovski, Andrej Neugebauer, Tibor Servátka, Maroš affil: Assistant Professor, Department of Economics & Finance, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, 00197 Italy Professor, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, 1359 Luxembourg Professor, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory, North Ryde NSW 2113, Australia Department of Finance, University of Economics in Bratislava, Bratislava, 85235 Slovakia su: Public goods Social entrepreneurship Internal revenue International sanctions Nash equilibrium sug: subj: Public goods Social entrepreneurship Internal revenue International sanctions Nash equilibrium ab: Publicly provided goods often create differential payoffs due to timely or spatial distances of group members. We design and test a provision mechanism which utilizes rank competition to mitigate free‐riding in impure public goods. In our Rank‐Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank‐Order‐VCM) group members compete via observable contributions for a larger share of the public good; high contributors receive preferential access (a larger share), while low contributors receive restricted access (a lower share). In a laboratory experiment, Rank‐Order‐VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the finitely played games with constant groups. In the control treatment, with randomly assigned ranks, the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time. We thus provide evidence of rank competition, in situations where discriminatory access to public goods is possible, being efficiency enhancing. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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