THE "SALES AGENT" PROBLEM: EFFORT/LEISURE ALLOCATION UNDER PERFORMANCE PAY AS BEHAVIOR TOWARDS RISK.
The choice between safe and risky assets represents behavior towards risk: more risk‐averse investors buy more safe assets. We develop and test a general model that applies this intuition to the time allocation between risky effort and risk‐free leisure under linear incentives. When risk increases w...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 57; no. 4; pp. 1997 - 2017 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=138089079&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 138089079 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2019 vid: 57 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 138089079 10.1111/ecin.12821 ppf: 1997 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 533KB tig: atl: THE "SALES AGENT" PROBLEM: EFFORT/LEISURE ALLOCATION UNDER PERFORMANCE PAY AS BEHAVIOR TOWARDS RISK. aug: au: Cadsby, C. Bram Song, Fei Zubanov, Nick affil: Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph ON, N1G 2W1, Canada Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University, Toronto ON, M5B 2K3, Canada Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Konstanz 78464, Germany su: Bribery Employee recruitment Sales commissions Labor incentives Multilevel models sug: subj: Bribery Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs) Human Resources Consulting Services Employee recruitment Sales commissions Labor incentives Multilevel models ab: The choice between safe and risky assets represents behavior towards risk: more risk‐averse investors buy more safe assets. We develop and test a general model that applies this intuition to the time allocation between risky effort and risk‐free leisure under linear incentives. When risk increases with effort, risk‐averse agents choose less effort, but when risk is independent of effort, effort choice is unaffected by risk preferences. In many incentive contracts, income risk is multiplicative with, rather than additive to effort, sales commissions being one example. In such cases, lower effort by the risk‐averse is a hitherto undocumented behavior towards risk pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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