THE "SALES AGENT" PROBLEM: EFFORT/LEISURE ALLOCATION UNDER PERFORMANCE PAY AS BEHAVIOR TOWARDS RISK.

The choice between safe and risky assets represents behavior towards risk: more risk‐averse investors buy more safe assets. We develop and test a general model that applies this intuition to the time allocation between risky effort and risk‐free leisure under linear incentives. When risk increases w...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 57; no. 4; pp. 1997 - 2017
Autores principales:	Cadsby, C. Bram, Song, Fei, Zubanov, Nick
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Oct2019
Materias:	Bribery Employee recruitment Sales commissions Labor incentives Multilevel models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost