Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?
In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008)...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 96; pp. 134 - 148 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Vilnius University
2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008) against Kriegel’s (2009a and 2009b) self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour. Straipsnyje ginama tezė, kad į išorinį-pasaulį-nukreiptą perceptyvinę sąmonę arba išorinį žinojimą visada lydi vidinis žinojimas (VŽIŽ). Tai prieštarauja nuomonei, jog į išorinį-pasaulį-nukreiptos sąmoningos psichinės būsenos nėra lydimos vidinio žinojimo. Būtent tokia vadovaujasi Gennaro (2008) kritikuodamas Kriegelio (2009a; 2009b) savi-reprezentacionalizmą. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti kodėl filosofai, mąstantys kaip Gennaro, klysta neigdami VŽIŽ tezę; tuo tikslu straipsnyje kritiškai tiriami filosofo argumentai prieš šią tezę ir pateikiami ją palaikantys argumentai. |
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