Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?
In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008)...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 96; pp. 134 - 148 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=140098575&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 140098575 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2019 vid: 96 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 140098575 10.15388/Problemos.96.11 ppf: 134 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 7.1MB tig: atl: Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception? aug: au: Chaturvedi, Madhu Mangal Sarma, A. V. Ravishankar affil: School of Philosophy & Culture, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University. Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur. su: Awareness Sensory perception Consciousness Philosophers Argument sug: subj: Awareness Sensory perception Consciousness Philosophers Argument keyword: Higher-Order-Thought Inner Awareness Perceptual Consciousness Self-representationalism aukštesnės eilės mintis perceptyvinė sąmonė savi-reprezentacionalizmas vidinis žinojimas ab: In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness (IAOA). This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro (2008) against Kriegel’s (2009a and 2009b) self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour. Straipsnyje ginama tezė, kad į išorinį-pasaulį-nukreiptą perceptyvinę sąmonę arba išorinį žinojimą visada lydi vidinis žinojimas (VŽIŽ). Tai prieštarauja nuomonei, jog į išorinį-pasaulį-nukreiptos sąmoningos psichinės būsenos nėra lydimos vidinio žinojimo. Būtent tokia vadovaujasi Gennaro (2008) kritikuodamas Kriegelio (2009a; 2009b) savi-reprezentacionalizmą. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti kodėl filosofai, mąstantys kaip Gennaro, klysta neigdami VŽIŽ tezę; tuo tikslu straipsnyje kritiškai tiriami filosofo argumentai prieš šią tezę ir pateikiami ją palaikantys argumentai. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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