Duhem's problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions.
When the results of an experiment appears to disconfirm a hypothesis, how does one know whether it's the hypothesis, or rather some auxiliary hypothesis or assumption, that is at fault? Philosophers' answers to this question, now known as "Duhem's problem," have differed widely. Despite these differ...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 1; pp. 337 - 355 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jan2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=141339558&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 141339558 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2020 vid: 197 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 141339558 10.1007/s11229-018-1845-1 ppf: 337 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 410KB tig: atl: Duhem's problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions. aug: au: Dietrich, Michael Honenberger, Phillip affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA su: Assignment problems (Programming) Information storage & retrieval systems Scientists Test systems Philosophers Problem solving sug: subj: Assignment problems (Programming) Information storage & retrieval systems Scientists Test systems Philosophers Problem solving keyword: Bayesian confirmation theory Darden, Lindley Duhem's problem Error statistics Inference to the best explanation Sober, Elliott ab: When the results of an experiment appears to disconfirm a hypothesis, how does one know whether it's the hypothesis, or rather some auxiliary hypothesis or assumption, that is at fault? Philosophers' answers to this question, now known as "Duhem's problem," have differed widely. Despite these differences, we affirm Duhem's original position that the logical structure of this problem alone does not allow a solution. A survey of philosophical approaches to Duhem's problem indicates that what allows any philosopher, or scientists for that matter, to solve this problem is the addition of epistemic information that guides their assignment of praise and blame after a negative test. We therefore advocate a distinction between the logical and epistemic formulations of Duhem's problem, the latter relying upon additional relevant information about the system being tested. Recognition of the role of this additional information suggests that some proposed solutions to the epistemic form of Duhem's problem are preferable over others. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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