| Sumario: | As will be clear below, the resulting criteria of dangerous vices are more broadly amenable to relational egalitarianism - the view that egalitarian moral principles are best explained in terms of the idea of relating as equals, i.e., the idea of social relations of equality.[7] Even if you do not accept Rousseau's concerns about inflamed amour-propre, I suspect that, in order to explain how (certain forms of) vanity are uniquely dangerous, you still will need to draw on criteria that similarly cohere with relational egalitarianism. Since relational egalitarianism is the general view that gives pride of place to the idea of persons relating as equals, it is hard to imagine, then, accounting for how (a certain form of) the vanity-vice poses unique moral dangers without some commitment to relational egalitarianism.[8] This is not an argument for relational egalitarianism. To specify the idea of people relating as equals, I utilize Rousseau's distinction between benign and inflamed amour-propre, for this, again, is what provides the background for Rousseau's worries about vanity as "the error most to be feared", and I think it also provides a useful conceptual framework for addressing the broader set of issues at hand.[10] Rousseau observes that, in being bound by social ties of any sort, we develop benign amour-propre - a desire to be taken seriously by others. I do not think so, because there may be vices, such as misanthropy, that are compatible with being a participant in egalitarian social relations (and so also are susceptible to interpersonal correction) but that, nevertheless, undermine an individual's moral development as a participant in egalitarian social relations.
|
|---|