When Vanity Is Dangerous.
As will be clear below, the resulting criteria of dangerous vices are more broadly amenable to relational egalitarianism - the view that egalitarian moral principles are best explained in terms of the idea of relating as equals, i.e., the idea of social relations of equality.[7] Even if you do not a...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 48; no. 1; pp. 6 - 40 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=141801580&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 141801580 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483915 PPA jtl: Philosophy & Public Affairs issn: 00483915 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2020 vid: 48 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 141801580 10.1111/papa.12156 ppf: 6 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 207KB tig: atl: When Vanity Is Dangerous. aug: au: Rozeboom, Grant J. su: Recognition (Philosophy) Political philosophy Developmental psychology Normativity (Ethics) Ethics sug: subj: Recognition (Philosophy) Political philosophy Developmental psychology Normativity (Ethics) Ethics ab: As will be clear below, the resulting criteria of dangerous vices are more broadly amenable to relational egalitarianism - the view that egalitarian moral principles are best explained in terms of the idea of relating as equals, i.e., the idea of social relations of equality.[7] Even if you do not accept Rousseau's concerns about inflamed amour-propre, I suspect that, in order to explain how (certain forms of) vanity are uniquely dangerous, you still will need to draw on criteria that similarly cohere with relational egalitarianism. Since relational egalitarianism is the general view that gives pride of place to the idea of persons relating as equals, it is hard to imagine, then, accounting for how (a certain form of) the vanity-vice poses unique moral dangers without some commitment to relational egalitarianism.[8] This is not an argument for relational egalitarianism. To specify the idea of people relating as equals, I utilize Rousseau's distinction between benign and inflamed amour-propre, for this, again, is what provides the background for Rousseau's worries about vanity as "the error most to be feared", and I think it also provides a useful conceptual framework for addressing the broader set of issues at hand.[10] Rousseau observes that, in being bound by social ties of any sort, we develop benign amour-propre - a desire to be taken seriously by others. I do not think so, because there may be vices, such as misanthropy, that are compatible with being a participant in egalitarian social relations (and so also are susceptible to interpersonal correction) but that, nevertheless, undermine an individual's moral development as a participant in egalitarian social relations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Public Affairs is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Public Affairs holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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