Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.
Robert Kane's libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane's claim that ther...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 3; pp. 1225 - 1241 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Mar2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Robert Kane's libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane's claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent's will is not yet appropriately structured. I then explain how this can assist Kane with the luck objection. |
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