Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.

Robert Kane's libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane's claim that ther...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 197; no. 3; pp. 1225 - 1241
Autor principal: Campbell, Neil
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Campbell, Neil
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Ave., West, N2L3C5, Waterloo, ON, Canada
      su:
        Explanation
        Fortune
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          Explanation
          Fortune
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        Contrastive explanation
        Free will
        Luck
        Responsibility
        Structuring causes
      ab: Robert Kane's libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane's claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent's will is not yet appropriately structured. I then explain how this can assist Kane with the luck objection.
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