Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies*.
It is easy enough to see that this thesis entails Stoljar's no-entailment thesis, at least if we understand phenomenal truths in such a way that if there is no conscious experience (or no conscious being) there are no phenomenal truths. If we have a good argument for dualism about smell experience,...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 488 - 498 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=143356893&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 143356893 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2020 vid: 54 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 143356893 10.1111/nous.12331 ppf: 488 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 109KB tig: atl: Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies*. aug: au: Chalmers, David J. affil: New York University su: Philosophy of mind Modern philosophy Cartesianism (Philosophy) Mind & body Monism Spacetime Holism sug: subj: Philosophy of mind Modern philosophy Cartesianism (Philosophy) Mind & body Monism Spacetime Holism ab: It is easy enough to see that this thesis entails Stoljar's no-entailment thesis, at least if we understand phenomenal truths in such a way that if there is no conscious experience (or no conscious being) there are no phenomenal truths. If we have a good argument for dualism about smell experience, dualism about dogs' experience, and dualism about future humans' experience, then we have established mind-body dualism. The view I am most inclined to accept is neither a purely phenomenal spatial functionalism (with only phenomenal roles) or nonphenomenal spatial functionalism, but a combined phenomenal/nonphenomenal spatial functionalism (combined spatial functionalism for short) where reference to space is fixed by both phenomenal and nonphenomenal roles. This response is closely related to Stoljar's objection 5, which says Stoljar's dilemma can be avoided by appealing to a nonphenomenal spatial functionalism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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