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Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies*.

It is easy enough to see that this thesis entails Stoljar's no-entailment thesis, at least if we understand phenomenal truths in such a way that if there is no conscious experience (or no conscious being) there are no phenomenal truths. If we have a good argument for dualism about smell experience,...

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Published in:Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 488 - 498
Main Author: Chalmers, David J.
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2020
Subjects:
Philosophy of mind
Modern philosophy
Cartesianism (Philosophy)
Mind & body
Monism
Spacetime
Holism
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost