Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation.
We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov‐perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behav...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 447 - 470 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=143852198&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 143852198 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2020 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 143852198 10.1111/1756-2171.12321 ppf: 447 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 421KB tig: atl: Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation. aug: au: Salz, Tobias Vespa, Emanuel affil: Massachusetts Institute of Technology UC Santa Barbara su: Forecasting Games Escape rooms Dynamic models Collusion sug: subj: Forecasting Games Toy and Hobby Goods and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers Doll, Toy, and Game Manufacturing Hobby, Toy, and Game Stores Escape rooms Dynamic models Collusion ab: We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov‐perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behavior was collusive, however, the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals. The laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments. Our main finding is that prediction errors due to collusion are modest in size. We also document a different deviation from equilibrium behavior (inertia) that can lead to large prediction errors. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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