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Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation.

We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov‐perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behav...

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Published in:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 447 - 470
Main Authors: Salz, Tobias, Vespa, Emanuel
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2020
Subjects:
Forecasting
Games
Escape rooms
Dynamic models
Collusion
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