AGENDA CONTROL AND RECIPROCITY IN SEQUENTIAL VOTING DECISIONS.

We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals no...

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Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 58; no. 4; pp. 1813 - 1830
Autores principales:	Fischbacher, Urs, Schudy, Simeon
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Oct2020
Materias:	Punishment Reciprocity (International law) Committees Voters Requests for proposals (Public contracts)
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost