AGENDA CONTROL AND RECIPROCITY IN SEQUENTIAL VOTING DECISIONS.
We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals no...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 58; no. 4; pp. 1813 - 1830 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2020
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=145974817&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 145974817 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 58 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 145974817 10.1111/ecin.12898 ppf: 1813 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 260KB tig: atl: AGENDA CONTROL AND RECIPROCITY IN SEQUENTIAL VOTING DECISIONS. aug: au: Fischbacher, Urs Schudy, Simeon affil: Department of Economics, University of Konstanz and Thurgau Institute of Economics, 78457, Constance, Germany Department of Economics, University of Munich, Geschwister‐Scholl‐Platz 1, D‐80539, Munich, Germany su: Punishment Reciprocity (International law) Committees Voters Requests for proposals (Public contracts) sug: subj: Punishment Reciprocity (International law) Committees Voters Requests for proposals (Public contracts) ab: We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|