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SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PLEA BARGAINING WITH COSTLY TRIALS AND BAYESIAN JURIES.

This paper investigates optimal plea bargaining when trials are costly, defendant guilt is uncertain, and juries rationally respond to the plea bargaining policy employed. The model shows that when innocence rates among the arrested are low, it is optimal to offer all defendants pleas that are accep...

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Publicado en:Economic Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 1; pp. 263 - 280
Autor principal: Bjerk, David
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2021
Materias:
Jury
Plea bargaining
Defendants
Economic policy
Frequency (Linguistics)
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost