SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PLEA BARGAINING WITH COSTLY TRIALS AND BAYESIAN JURIES.
This paper investigates optimal plea bargaining when trials are costly, defendant guilt is uncertain, and juries rationally respond to the plea bargaining policy employed. The model shows that when innocence rates among the arrested are low, it is optimal to offer all defendants pleas that are accep...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 59; no. 1; pp. 263 - 280 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=147223343&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 147223343 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2021 vid: 59 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 147223343 10.1111/ecin.12922 ppf: 263 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 546KB tig: atl: SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PLEA BARGAINING WITH COSTLY TRIALS AND BAYESIAN JURIES. aug: au: Bjerk, David affil: Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont CA, 91711, USA su: Jury Plea bargaining Defendants Economic policy Frequency (Linguistics) sug: subj: Jury Plea bargaining Defendants Economic policy Frequency (Linguistics) ab: This paper investigates optimal plea bargaining when trials are costly, defendant guilt is uncertain, and juries rationally respond to the plea bargaining policy employed. The model shows that when innocence rates among the arrested are low, it is optimal to offer all defendants pleas that are acceptable to guilty and innocent defendants. However, as the innocence rate becomes more significant, optimal plea policy switches to one in which plea offers are only acceptable to guilty defendants. However, even when optimal, the societal benefits to such separating policies are limited due to constraints on the frequency such offers can be made. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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