WHY METAETHICS NEEDS EMPIRICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY.
What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse's evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse's argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that pe...
| Publicado en: | Crítica Vol. 52; no. 155; pp. 27 - 55 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas
ago2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=147571588&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 147571588 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00111503 H9Y jtl: Crítica issn: 00111503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: ago2020 vid: 52 iid: 155 pid: 10429 pub: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas artinfo: ui: 147571588 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1193 ppf: 27 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 771KB tig: atl: WHY METAETHICS NEEDS EMPIRICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. aug: au: HOPSTER, JEROEN KLENK, MICHAEL affil: University of Graz and University of Twente Delft University of Technology su: Metaethics Ruse, Michael Philosophy Evolutionary ethics Empirical research sug: subj: Metaethics Ruse, Michael Philosophy Evolutionary ethics Empirical research keyword: ética conceptual argumentos evolutivos conceptual ethics evolutionary debunking arguments experimental moral psychology fertilidad fruitfulness Michael Ruse psicología moral experimental ética conceptual argumentos evolutivos fertilidad psicología moral experimental ab: What is the significance of empirical moral psychology for metaethics? In this article we take up Michael Ruse's evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and reassess it in the context of the empirical state of the art. Ruse's argument depends on the phenomenological presumption that people generally experience morality as objective. We demonstrate how recent experimental findings challenge this widely-shared armchair presumption and conclude that Ruse's argument fails. We situate this finding in the recent debate about Carnapian explication and argue that it illustrates the necessary role that empirical moral psychology plays in explication preparation. Moral psychology sets boundaries for reasonable desiderata in metaethics and, therefore, it is necessary for metaethics. ¿Qué papel desempeña la psicología moral y empírica para la metaética? En este artículo analizamos el argumento evolutivo de Michael Ruse contra el realismo moral y lo contrastamos con las últimas investigaciones empíricas. El argumento de Ruse depende de la asunción fenomenológica de que la gente generalmente considera la moralidad como objetiva. Demostramos cómo las recientes investigaciones experimentales desafían esta asunción ampliamente compartida y no contrastada experimentalmente, por lo que concluimos que el argumento de Ruse falla. Nuestras conclusiones se sitúan en el reciente debate sobre la explicación de Carnap y muestran el papel necesario que la psicología moral y empírica tienen en la preparación de explicaciones. La psicología moral establece los límites de los desiderata metaéticos razonables, y, por tanto, es necesaria para la metaética. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Crítica is the property of Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Crítica holder: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|