Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood*.
A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of "knowledge from falsehood," i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Investigations Vol. 44; no. 2; pp. 151 - 163 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of "knowledge from falsehood," i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions. |
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