Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood*.

A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of "knowledge from falsehood," i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Investigations Vol. 44; no. 2; pp. 151 - 163
Autor principal: Lee, Kok Yong
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Apr2021
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      ab: A number of philosophers have recently proposed several alleged cases of "knowledge from falsehood," i.e., cases of inferential knowledge epistemised by an inference with a false crucial premise. This paper examines such cases and argues against interpreting them as cases of knowledge from falsehood. Specifically, I argue that the inferences in play in such cases are in no position to epistemise their conclusions.
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