The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist.
Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 4; pp. 1381 - 1402 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic groups will face a multitude of strategic choices. I illustrate several contexts where individuals who are concerned solely with the discovery of truth will nonetheless face difficult game theoretic problems. Examples of purely epistemic coordination problems and social dilemmas will be presented. These show that there is a far deeper connection between economics and epistemology than previous appreciated. |
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