The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist.

Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 4; pp. 1381 - 1402
Autor principal: Zollman, Kevin J. S.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Zollman, Kevin J. S.
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Baker Hall 161, 15213, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
      su:
        Theory of knowledge
        Metaphysics
        Pragmatics
        Developmental psychology & motivation
        Dilemma
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        subj:
          Theory of knowledge
          Metaphysics
          Pragmatics
          Developmental psychology & motivation
          Dilemma
      keyword:
        Disagreement
        Formal epistemology
        Game theory
        Scoring rules
        Social epistemology
      ab: Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic groups will face a multitude of strategic choices. I illustrate several contexts where individuals who are concerned solely with the discovery of truth will nonetheless face difficult game theoretic problems. Examples of purely epistemic coordination problems and social dilemmas will be presented. These show that there is a far deeper connection between economics and epistemology than previous appreciated.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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      src: R
    language: English
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