Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections.
I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account an...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 29; no. 1; pp. 152 - 168 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account and finally present my own view which, I argue, retains Ryle's insights while avoiding his mistakes. |
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