Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections.

I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account an...

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Publicado en:European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 29; no. 1; pp. 152 - 168
Autor principal: Brandt, Stefan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections.
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        au: Brandt, Stefan
        affil: Friedrich‐Alexander‐Universität Erlangen‐Nürnberg (FAU), Institute of Philosophy, Erlangen, Germany
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        Practical judgment
        Ryle, Gilbert, 1900-1976
        Maxims
        Intellectual life
        Logical fallacies
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          Practical judgment
          Ryle, Gilbert, 1900-1976
          Maxims
          Intellectual life
          Logical fallacies
      ab: I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account and finally present my own view which, I argue, retains Ryle's insights while avoiding his mistakes.
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