Managing adverse selection: underinsurance versus underenrollment.

Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I est...

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Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 359 - 382
Autor principal:	Saltzman, Evan
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Jun2021
Materias:	California Government policy Intervention (Federal government) Insurance Insurance exchanges Health insurance exchanges
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost